Georges Bataille and the Ruinous Role of Nonknowledge in Derrida\u27s Unconditional Hospitality by Mubirumusoke, Mukasa





Abstract: At the beginning of the twenty-first century, when political debates concerning 
strangers and foreigners often gestured towards hostility, Jacques Derrida took the exact oppo-
site position, demanding that the stranger and foreigner be welcomed with unconditional hos-
pitality. As with the other themes that fall within Derrida’s political and ethical corpus, readers 
of his discussions on hospitality often find it difficult to reconcile his proposed position with any 
practical application. In particular, readers often take issue with the extreme vulnerability that 
he demands of the acting agent and the consistent questioning of his position’s possibility. This 
paper attempts to address the motivations behind his radical demands by exploring points of 
congruence with Georges Bataille’s project of inner experience, focusing particularly on a 
shared understanding of the role that nonknowledge plays in necessitating both extreme risk 
and impossibility. I contend that the central role of nonknowledge frames Derrida’s 
unconditional hospitality as a Bataillen project of self-ruination.
Keywords: Jacques Derrida, Georges Bataille, nonknowledge, unconditional hosptitality, self-
ruination, inner experience




From the sun I learned this: when he goes down, over-rich; he pours gold into 
the sea out of inexhaustible riches so that even the poorest fisherman still rows 
with golden oars. For this I once saw and I did not tire of my tears as I watched 
it.1
—Friedrich Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra
As we confront our newly envisioned global community, the habits, creeds, and beliefs that 
should stabilize our sense of identity have become detached and float high above the founda-
tion of selfhood that once anchored us securely. In this vulnerable state of suspense, we in-
creasingly feel the need to question concepts that once slipped imperceptibly in and out of 
our daily activities. Take hospitality for instance: no longer does it fit neatly within the limited 
scope of behavior we associate with neighborly rituals, such as lighting a jack-o-lantern on 
Halloween or offering a glass of wine to a visiting  neighbor. In our newly constituted foreign 
world, hospitality has much broader horizons, beginning first and foremost with the stranger 
who appears increasingly at the threshold of our door, our computer, our community, and our 
country. 
Yet, amidst the imminent danger of the foreign other, Jacques Derrida contends we 
must embrace an unconditionally open hospitality. The issue of an unconditional hospitality 
retains a contentious space in Derrida’s deconstructive approach to politics and ethics. 
Derrida’s contention that unconditional hospitality provides the basis for approaching ethics 
inevitably raises a number of questions: Why would Derrida propose a hospitality that leaves 
the host at his or her utmost vulnerable? What are his intentions when he questions the very 
possibility of the ethical situation that he demands? 
The answers to these questions are neither clear nor easily attainable, but I believe a 
consideration of Georges Bataille’s project of inner experience provides a means to approach-
ing  them constructively. If we think of hospitality as Derrida does, at the limits of possibility 
and vulnerability, then we are inevitably condemned to look beyond any traditional ethical 
framework. The Bataillean project of inner experience shares with Derrida a position at the 
limit of nonknowledge and, when considered appropriately, serves as a guiding  light to those 
disconcerting  issues that rest at the core of Derrida’s ethical agency. I suggest that 
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unconditional hospitality is not a categorical imperative that simply demands the most ap-
proximate attempts of its realization. Instead, the central role of nonknowledge frames 
unconditional hospitality as a Bataillean project of self-ruination that entails an omnipresent 
risk and a goal that is necessarily impossible.
Derrida’s Unconditional Hospitality
 Derrida’s account of hospitality begins at the threshold of an encounter: on one side 
resides the sovereign host and on the other side, the foreign other. This threshold is defined 
not in the mere opposition of these two agents, but rather at the moment of a decision. The 
host must decide how she will welcome, if at the all, the foreigner as a guest into her home. 
Therefore, the foreign other’s arrival plays a constitutive role by allowing the host to recognize 
herself as a sovereign, as the deciding agent. With this recognition, the host can either allow 
the other access to herself, to her home, or ban the other to the outside. The decision rests 
solely with the host whether or not the other will be allowed into this relationship. What 
should appear as a familiar and politically potent scenario of host and guest inaugurates the 
paradigm of ethics for Derrida. The possibility of ethics takes place with the decision of the 
host, as sovereign, to allow the guest into a hospitable relation.2 
Traditionally, the decision of the host finds refuge in the laws set for hospitality. In an 
interview entitled Hospitality, Justice, and Responsibility, Derrida explains that traditional hospi-
tality belongs to the same logic as gift-giving. In other words, the laws of hospitality function 
within the economy of an exchange.3  The gift of traditional hospitality must be accompanied 
with a gift that recognizes the hospitality such as a greeting card, beer, or perhaps even the 
simple exchange of a name. The laws of hospitality, therefore, prescribe that the host’s decision 
follows from the logic of a reciprocal exchange. Within this exchange the host’s sovereignty is 
not only affirmed in the moment of decision at the threshold, but also confirmed with the gift. 
The gift reinscribes the host as master, as the one who demands, and commands, tangible rec-
ognition of her position as the self-identifiable opposite of the guest. 
At this point we can see why Derrida would rearticulate this traditional schema of hos-
pitality as conditional. Traditional hospitality defines itself at a threshold where the host’s de-
cision is presumed to be conditioned by a predictable logic of reciprocation. It is as if the host, 
once brought face-to-face with the other, must find refuge from otherness—both the 
stranger’s and his own otherness—by affirming  and employing laws that establish a recogniz-
able and repeatable order. The homogeneity these laws seek both masks and wards off any un-
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expected contestation of the established order. Thus, the very foundation of hospitality, wel-
coming the other, requires that the host’s decision function as a cog  within the hospitality ma-
chine. In this machine, the other is not welcomed as other, but rather as another already ap-
propriable cog. The other’s foreignness is not enjoyed and celebrated as foreign, but is instead 
appropriated and muffled by the stranger’s ability to comply with the laws, i.e., the ability to 
provide a gift in return. For Derrida true hospitality cannot subsume the other and therefore 
cannot participate in this machine of homogenization. To redefine hospitality, a reinterpreta-
tion of the decision at the threshold is necessary. 
To free hospitality from the conditions that reduce the other into an economy of 
knowledge and sameness, the decision of hospitality must be unconditional, without laws. Un-
conditionality would allow the hospitable gesture to emerge freely from the host. For Derrida, 
simply following through to a self-determined end undermines the very possibility of free de-
cision. In fact, Derrida argues that a decision is not determined by the “self” per se, but rather 
that “for a decision to be made, it must be made by the other in myself.”4 The conception of 
decision as arising  out of “the other in me” highlights the inadequacy of any decision that an-
ticipates and follows from the laws of conditional hospitality. I must appeal to the other in 
me—the other outside the realm of knowledge—because the self-present me, such as me as 
host before a threshold with a guest on the other side, is always already inscribed within a cal-
culable economy of knowledge and exchange. 
Derrida recognizes that even within the raw experience of an encounter with the other, 
the host is still subject to laws of identification and appropriation. Therefore, while these laws 
and the knowledge they provide are indispensable to my decision, they nevertheless will sub-
ject me to a logic that pre-determines the decision. Derrida explains, “If we knew what to do, if 
I knew in terms of knowledge what I have to do before the decision, then the decision would 
not be a decision. It would be the application of a rule, the consequence of a premise, and 
there would be no problem, there would be no decision.”5 With conditional hospitality, no de-
cision, in the Derridian sense, actually occurs; rather, the logic of exchange has already antici-
pated and determined the host’s response to the foreigner. And, as discussed above, this con-
ditional relationship necessarily reduces the otherness of the guest into the logic of sameness 
and knowledge, even though “decision, an ethical or a political responsibility, is absolutely 
heterogeneous to knowledge.”6  To avoid the consequences of conditional hospitality, a deci-
sion should arise from the otherness within me that absconds from laws of conditional hospi-
tality and calls forth the unconditional acceptance of the other as other. Decisions must there-
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fore be difficult and even terrible, but only from difficulty and terror can the host emerge from 
the paralysis of undecidability and invoke the otherness that is shared with the guest as op-
posed to the sovereignty that is not. 
With this account of the decision in mind, unconditional hospitality requires the ab-
sence of any traditional agency. The host as sovereign of the house withdraws from her self-
identifiable place of mastery, freeing the otherness within and opening  herself to the other-
ness without. Derrida envisions this hospitable gesture rhetorically as a split of the self. He 
explains, “There would be no responsibility or decision without some self-interruption, nei-
ther would there be any hospitality; as master and host, the self in welcoming the other, must 
interrupt or divide himself or herself. This division is the condition of hospitality.”7 
Unconditional hospitality exposes the division of the master and thus suspends her mastery 
over the home. 
Accompanying the suspension of mastery, unconditional hospitality also requires the 
host to welcome any other, all others, the absolute other, no questions asked. The tether to 
conditions must be completely snapped. Thus, “if you exclude the possibility that the new-
comer is coming  to destroy your house—if you want to control this and exclude in advance 
this possibility—there is no hospitality. In this case, you control the borders, you have custom 
officers, you have a door.”8 An absolute exposure of this sort should engender absolute fright 
and absolute emptiness. To be absolutely open to anyone would entail an exposure that leaves 
every bit of the host outside the host, as if she had poured herself out, like Zarathustra’s sun, 
to the other she does not know and refuses to know. This unconditionality is what Derrida 
demands. There must be no moment of exchange; there must be no check points; there must 
be utter and complete exposure: this is the only suitable gift.
 To further explicate what unconditional hospitality entails, Derrida also problematizes 
the functioning of language at the threshold of hospitality. “Does hospitality consist in interro-
gating  the new arrival?” asks Derrida, “Does it begin with the question addressed to the new-
comer: what is your name .... Or else does hospitality begin with the unquestioning  welcome, 
in a double effacement, the effacement of the question and the name.”9 The host cannot even 
ask the other his or her name; this traditionally amicable offer involves a notion of exchange, 
of familiarity, of identity, of knowledge. Therefore, even this seemingly benign discursive prac-
tice must be excluded in the decision of unconditional hospitality. 
However, while complete openness radically excludes logos, even to the extreme of for-
bidding  language from hospitality, it also, in the same gesture, radically includes the other. 
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“The awaited guest is not only someone to whom you say ‘come’” says Derrida, “but 
‘enter,’...occupy me, take place in me.”10  Moreover, with this occupation, “the master of the 
house is at home, but nonetheless he comes to enter his home through the guest.”11 Derrida’s 
statement sounds counterintuitive, but in fact is not: the guest allows the master to “enter his 
home” because the guest calls forth the other within the host. An encounter with the foreign 
other, through the decision of unconditional hospitality, provides the host with a complete pic-
ture of her home, which must consist of both the self and the other within. The heterogeneous 
singularity of the guest opens the host to her own infinite singularity, thus exposing an impas-
sible distance and yet, “this separation, this dissociation is not only a limit, but it is also the 
condition of the relation to the other, a non-relation as relation,” and this is the shared mo-
ment of hospitality.12 
Conversely, while in the same breath of demanding unconditional hospitality, Derrida 
consistently questions whether such a radical gesture can actually occur. These moments of 
reservation haunt Derrida’s reflections on hospitality. They taunt the reader and at times seem 
to be an insurance taken out by Derrida—as if to rid himself of responsibility in the event of 
unconditional hospitality’s inevitable failure. Time and time again he deploys expressions such 
as “if such hospitality exists” and “whether such hospitality is possible.”13 His disclaimers are 
an anxious rhythm that punctuates the text. Malek Moazzam-Doulat also questions this “abso-
lute” or “unconditional” hospitality that accompanies Derrida’s radical interpretation of politi-
cal decisionism. Moazzam-Doulat hesitates to embrace the full implications of Derrida’s posi-
tion and asks the reader, “Can we never say no? Can we affirm an absolute openness to what-
ever is to come with so much danger, so much monstrosity behind us and on our horizons?”14
Given the set parameters of unconditional hospitality, both authors’ reservations seem 
undoubtedly warranted. In our daily lives, how could an experience possibly occur in which 
absolutely no conditions accompany our encounter with the other? Won’t there always be a 
sign-in sheet, a door, a name in our way? Unconditional hospitality demands a transcendence 
of the limits of duty and necessity, and yet it appears to be an unfeasible goal. Derrida explains 
in Of Hospitality, 
It is as though hospitality were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality 
defined this very impossibility, as if it were only possible to transgress it, as 
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though the law of absolute, unconditional hospitality…commanded that we 
transgress all the laws (in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the conditions, the 
norms, the rights and the duties that are imposed on host and hostess….15 
 In light of this necessary transgression, a more pressing impediment remains. Struc-
turally speaking, unconditional hospitality is inextricably tied, and thus limited, by the laws of 
conditional hospitality. The transgression that unconditionality demands remains bound to the 
laws it attempts to push aside. Unconditional hospitality unveils an aporia that accompanies all 
attempted applications of universal law. Just a few pages later Derrida states quite plainly:
 …the law [of unconditional hospitality] is above the laws. It is thus illegal, 
transgressive, outside the law…. But even while keeping itself above the laws of 
hospitality, the unconditional law of hospitality needs the laws, it requires them. 
This demand is constitutive. It wouldn’t be effectively unconditional, the law, if 
it didn’t have to become effective, concrete, determined, if that were not its be-
ing as having-to-be…. In order to be what it is, the law thus needs the laws.16 
Which is to say, the unconditional law of hospitality, in its sweeping generality, must account 
for the particular in each situation and thus be conditioned by this particularity, i.e., condi-
tioned by the singularity of the foreign other’s arrival. The instant a foreigner arrives at the 
threshold, his or her unique particularity usurps the attempted unconditional hospitable ges-
ture of the host. Intrinsic to the enforcement of universal law is the disruption by the singular 
that necessarily accompanies it. Derrida nevertheless stresses the necessity to engage this apo-
ria of unconditional hospitality. What would it mean to will an unconditional hospitality under 
these restrictions, or more interestingly how does the impossible become possible, or even 
worthwhile? For these questions, Georges Bataille and his definition of community and inner 
experience provide a framework for further examining unconditional hospitality. 
Community, Inner Experience, and Hospitality
Community—as a union based on nonknowledge and inoperativity—occupies a pivotal 
position in Bataille’s thought, and along its axis rotates three different conceptions and 
articulations.17  Perhaps the most notable conception of community became manifest in the 
two politically motivated groups Bataille founded in the late 1930s: the sacrificial group 
Acéphale and the group of intellectuals known as the College of Sociology. A second 
Bataillean notion of community supports the economics of expenditure, explored at length in 
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the three-volume work, The Accursed Share. The last, and that which is relevant here, is the 
community that accompanies what Bataille designates “inner experience.” Inner experience 
attempts to account for an ecstatic subjectivity and a radical rethinking of intersubjectivity, by 
way of complicating traditional notions of community. 
Inner experience refers to a realm of experience distinct from knowledge that con-
ceives of the self not as enclosed but outside itself, exposed, excessive, and inappropriable. 
This excessive subject belongs to a community bound by the communication of his or her ex-
penditure. Insofar as the self always already communicates its excessiveness, the community 
that binds it to the excess of the other does not come to formation, but always already exists. 
The primordial community of inner experience opens up a view beyond the self-enclosed sub-
ject of discursive practices. Bataille holds reservations about the subject who gains knowledge 
through discourse because, as Andrew Mitchell and Jason Winfree explain in their introduc-
tion to The Obsessions of Georges Bataille, “to know is to possess knowledge. But once the 
known is possessed and internalized, the relation to what lies beyond the self is severed and 
our contact with the outside regulated and neutralized.”18 The communication that belongs to 
the community of inner experience cannot be possessed or internalized in any such fashion. 
Therefore, Bataille’s community suggests a space where we, as selves, can account for one an-
other as truly sharing  and not as severed by our determinate knowledge of one another. The 
community of inner experience clears a space for the ontological condition of the self ecstati-
cally communing  with others “which is opposed to the ‘turning  in on oneself’”19  that charac-
terizes the knowledgeable subject of discursive practices.20
Bataille’s break from the self-enclosed subject in favor of the ecstatic self of inner ex-
perience parallels the issue of hospitality and the role of nonknowledge as framed by Derrida. 
Derrida’s aversion to conditional hospitality stems from its inscription within a discursive 
practice wherein the otherness of the guest and the authenticity of the gift are appropriated by 
the laws of exchange. Hospitality, in this register, becomes a duty that emerges from the exter-
nal demand of law; however, “for it to be what it ‘must’ be, hospitality must not pay a debt or 
be governed by a duty: it is gracious…this unconditional law of hospitality, if such a thing is 
thinkable, would then be a law without imperative, without order and without duty. A law 
without law.”21  Bataille shares this aversion to the homogenous nature of knowledge that al-
lows for the execution of order, laws, and duties. Inner experience marks a subjectivity that ul-
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timately contests the motions of conditional hospitality. As with Derrida’s unconditional hos-
pitality, inner experience refuses to participate in an economy of quantifiable exchange and 
instead concerns the excess that breaches the limits of these laws. We can read the goal of 
conditional hospitality as an attempt to articulate and separate the host and guest through the 
identification of their subjectivity by way of their respective gifts—the gift of hospitality to the 
guest and the reciprocal gift of gratitude to the host. 
Inner experience, as articulated thus far, may seem to imply that the self simply slides 
away completely into the other, into a primordial community of complete dissolution, but that 
is not case. The self of inner experience, in its excess, retains a sense of identification amongst 
the others. The collapse of distance that characterizes community dissolves the self as a 
knowledgeable subject, not as a singular being. Therefore, while Mitchell and Winfree may 
recognize that “communication is a giving, a giving oneself over to what is other,” they also still 
maintain that “communication comes to name the indigestibility of the other, the persistence 
of the foreign at the heart of the same.”22 These two characteristics of communication require 
that the Bataillean self does indeed retain a sense of itself, precisely to the extent that the self 
hosts the other through the communication of this incommunicable excess. 
For Derrida, the internal other plays a pivotal role within the framework of the deci-
sion. The hospitable decision must come from “the other within.” This other within does not 
belong to the realm of knowledge and the laws that bring  one to the undecidability that pre-
cedes and allows for decision making—nor can the other within be reduced to this logic af-
terward. “When we make a decision,” Derrida explains, “we don’t know and we shouldn’t 
know. If we know there would be no decision.”23 To know of the decision is to inscribe the de-
cision into the realm of knowledge. Instead, the decision must remain in the realm of 
nonknowledge, where the other of the subject—any subject, host or guest—resides.
 Derrida and Bataille thus both appeal to an otherness that belongs to the self, within 
the self, all the while never subsuming  the self. For Bataille’s inner experience, the inner oth-
erness functions to bring  together and distinguish the subject in the context of the primordial 
community of nonknowledge; for Derrida, the inner otherness of the subject must make the 
decision that occupies the space of nonknowledge. In both cases, more specifically in the case 
of Derrida, our acknowledgment of our otherness—insofar as it requires a withdrawal from 
knowledge—exposes us to the other in a way that entails extreme risk.
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Risk and Impossibility: The Limits of Nonknowledge for Bataille and Derrida
In inner experience, the self’s radical openness and outpouring naturally entails risk. 
The subject risks itself as it knows itself, literally. Inner experience requires exposure to a 
world beyond comprehension, and, moreover, to the other beyond comprehension. “‘Commu-
nication’ cannot proceed from one full and intact individual to another,” Bataille writes. “It re-
quires individuals whose separate existence is risked.”24 The risk of self follows from the same 
logic as before: one risks the dissolution of one’s self-enclosed identity. And, as a moment of 
inner experience, it marks an ontological risk that occurs and persists as one exists and inhab-
its the realm of nonknowledge and is exposed to the otherness of community. Therefore, one is 
always already at risk of losing oneself in relation to the other insofar as one is always already 
exposed to the other that permeates, and thus challenges, the self-possessed Cartesian subject. 
The desired mastery of self and other that accompanies any attempt at acquiring knowledge is 
replaced by the helplessness and abandonment of inner experience. 
For Derrida’s unconditional hospitality, the exposure to the risk of the other takes on a 
similar indispensable position. In contrast to the rules and regulations that govern conditional 
hospitality, Derrida suggests a lawless welcoming  of the guest. When one decides, from the 
other within, to expose oneself to the guest beyond the restrictions of customs and knowledge, 
there is risk. On the one hand, there is the obtrusive fact of risking physical danger: “For 
unconditional hospitality to take place” explains Derrida, “you have to accept the risk of the 
other coming  and destroying the place.”25 The other may be a robber, a murderer, a predator of 
any sort, and by opening  oneself unconditionally to the guest, one runs the inevitable risk that 
this will be the last time you welcome anyone. Yet, on the other hand, there remains the risk 
that Bataille has in mind, a risk that belongs intrinsically to modalities of nonknowledge such 
as unconditional hospitality. 
At its core, Derrida’s unconditional hospitality presents a challenge: a challenge to risk 
one’s sense of self. Derrida’s call to open one’s borders completely to the other is fundamen-
tally an ontological call. Hospitality entails that one must not only risk one’s physical self, but 
also one’s own knowledgeable self and one’s knowledgeable world. Opening  oneself in this 
manner would be the only means of acknowledging and respecting the other as completely 
and heterogeneously other. All knowledge-mediated gestures must be rejected at the thresh-
old. While it may seem that asking a person his or her name or offering someone a drink 
would be an indispensable hospitable gesture, these offerings must, at the very least, be sus-
pended. Bataille would agree with Derrida on this point: Language inscribes the other into the 
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logic of exchange and therefore cannot accompany a true acknowledgment of otherness. On 
this issue Derrida suggests, “We have come to wonder whether absolute, hyperbolic, 
unconditional hospitality doesn’t consist in suspending language,”26  while Bataille more ag-
gressively asserts, “Profound communication demands silence.”27 Once you attach rules, such 
as those implied in language and discourse, to this encounter, the guest’s otherness retracts 
and becomes assimilated as something homogenous and precisely not other. Then there runs 
the greater risk of objectifying  the other, viewing the other as something at one’s own disposal, 
and as the end of one’s mastery. Objectification should never serve as the grounds for ethics; 
although at times in history it has and with devastating costs. 
 However, before one can even deny objectification and come to terms with the wager 
of exposure, it must be clear that the other that arrives always already exposes the host, always 
already disrupts the other within the host. The ontological risk of hospitality occurs before the 
decision, with the arrival of the other and the summons of the host to the threshold. That is to 
say, the risk always already exists simply by virtue of the other’s existence. At the sound of a 
knock, your ontological self becomes exposed to otherness and otherness to you. At this point, 
before the threshold, the other is outside the host’s normal predication of knowledge: she 
does not know his name, why he is there, or who he is. The host is very much exposed to this 
other—and often times this other to the host. Therefore, the host is already ruptured at the 
threshold. For Derrida it thus becomes a matter of whether you are to embrace this primordial 
exposure to the other, this challenging of the self by the community of inner experience, or if 
you are to close it off by asking  for a gift, asking for a name, or by making other knowledge-
founded demands. These options situate the undecidability that precedes the decision of hos-
pitality, but in order for hospitality to actually occur, the host must pick the former options 
and wager on vulnerability. Unconditional hospitality, and the possibility of ethics, demands 
full exposure—a Nietzschean amor fati. It asks of the host to affirm the exposure that the other 
has always already created and only with this complete affirmative embrace of the other do we 
have hospitality and the possibility of ethics. Only by trying to defer the knowledgeable rela-
tionship that the other summons with her knock can the discourse of ethics begin. With this 
choice, the host assumes an agency that acknowledges the guest as other and therefore as 
someone who can participate in an ethical discourse. The host approaches the other as an in-
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dividual who warrants ethical consideration.28 Derrida’s claim that hospitality demands radical 
openness reflects a challenge for the self to embrace its openness, and in doing so, willfully 
suspend the mastery allotted to him as a subject who can know and who employs rules. We 
must not forget, however, that along  with this unprecedented demand, Derrida also contests 
its possibility. “If there is such a thing” says Derrida of true hospitality, “I’m not sure.”29 
Bataille broaches this issue of possibility and nonknowledge in terms of community in 
Inner Experience. The book marks a project to access the primordial community and to com-
municate outside the confines of logical rules, i.e., outside of knowledge. Yet any attempt to 
accomplish a goal with these intentions, such as writing  a book, nevertheless inherently par-
ticipates in the logic of the restricted economy that Bataille wishes to avoid. The aporia is 
straightforward, compelling Bataille to proclaim, “Principle of inner experience: to emerge 
through project from the realm of project.”30 Such an emergence in fact is impossible. Despite 
Bataille’s great efforts—and the structure and polyphonic character of Inner Experience are a 
testament to these efforts—his work falls short; it is insufficient. But perhaps this insufficiency, 
this failure, was what Bataille had envisioned. Jason Winfree explains Bataille’s position in re-
sponse to the same remark from Inner Experience quoted above:
the principle of inner experience, in other words, concerns the use or deploy-
ment of project—that is, the restricted economic structure of ends-and-means 
utility, work, discourse, adequation—for the sake of an end that states utterly 
apart from project, an end without any means, an end that project could not 
conceivably effect, produce, or achieve. For this reason, Bataille understands 
experience as a revolt against project that nevertheless makes itself into a pro-
ject that cannot be fulfilled, thereby ruining  project and finding  itself in one 
respect as that non-fulfillment and ruin. This ruin is neither a failure nor a 
celebration of failure, however, but the excessive character of finite and exposed 
existence articulated in merely economic or dialectical terms. And that is to say 
that Bataille’s project is impossible.31
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28 What the rules or conditions of a particular ethics may entail is not of question at this juncture. The decision to 
challenge the self occurs before an actual ethics is proposed and only entails that the host recognize the other indi-
vidual as an individual, thus opening the possibility of ethics. It is possible to not say yes, or at least gesture towards  
rejection, and this occurs—to varying degrees—with conditional hospitality. In such a situation, the host says no by 
deciding first and foremost to employ rules that subsume the other. The host subjects the guest to the possibility of 
becoming a disposable object—such as Heidegger’s “bestand”—without any consideration of his or her in-
appropriable singularity as an individual. 
29 Derrida, “Hospitality, Justice, and Responsibility,” 71.
30 Bataille, Inner Experience, 46.
31 Jason Winfree, “The Expiation of Authority: Toward a Genealogy of Community,” Epoché 10.1 (2005): 188.
Bataille’s project of inner experience thus is impossible insofar as its goal to purge the limits 
of nonknowledge stands completely at odds with the means it has for expression. Moreover, 
this very failure marks the trace of that nonknowledge that the failed project had intended to 
articulate and inaugurate. Impossibility, therefore, points to what always already exists indi-
rectly, and does so through the trace that always ruins project. It is as if the primordial com-
munity of inner experience is breaking through the cracks of Bataille’s works, and yet the 
source of this destruction can never be apprehended. The impossibility and failure of 
unconditional hospitality, I suggest, marks an analogous trace of the realm of nonknowledge 
from which it emerges and also fails to articulate. 
Following from Jason Winfree’s reading  of Bataille, it appears that the impossibility of 
unconditional hospitality that Derrida persistently intimates marks the trace of the realm of 
nonknowledge that unconditional hospitality beckons the host to embrace. Unconditional 
hospitality requires the complete suspension of the restrictive economic exchange that neces-
sarily accompanies any encounter with the singular individual. To be completely unconditional 
one would not only have to avoid speaking, but also any sort of conditional rule or expectation 
for the guest. Any attempts to follow the laws of hospitality undermine the very structure of 
the law in general, but, in the very same gesture, it exposes us to a “beyond-the-law,” where 
unconditional hospitality—and justice for that matter—dwell. Unconditional hospitality de-
termines the possibility of hospitality, as the universal law that grounds hospitality. But, as a 
result of this very determining  nature, unconditional hospitality stands outside the laws of 
hospitality. Derrida argues this aporia accompanies any conception of law; therefore, the issue 
is of the structure of hospitality, not of satisfying an ever elusive utopic desire. Derrida makes 
this distinction clear when he explains, “pure unconditionality appears inaccessible, and inac-
cessible not only as a regulatory idea, an Idea in the Kantian sense and infinitely removed, al-
ways inadequately approached, but inaccessible for the structural reasons, ‘barred’ by the in-
ternal contradictions we have analyzed.”32  Unconditional hospitality’s aporetic structure im-
plies that, just as with inner experience, Derrida has proposed a ruinous project. Moreover, 
this ruin does not imply the impossibility of ethics, but rather its inauguration. And if this is 
the case, then a ruin could be something desirable, something  great, something lov-
able—“what else is there to love anyway?” Derrida once asked.33 
In an essay on Derrida’s ethics, François Raffoul characterizes Derrida’s notion of im-
possibility quite succinctly:
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32 Derrida, Of Hospitality, 149.
33 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law,” Cardozo Law Review 11.919 (1990): 1009.
The impossible would no longer be the opposite of the possible but, on the 
contrary, would be what “haunts the possible,” what truly “enables” or possibi-
lizes the possible. The impossible, Derrida would claim, is possible, not in the 
sense that it would become possible, but in a more radical sense in which the 
impossible, as impossible, is possible.34
Following from Raffoul’s argument, I suggest the impossible, as impossible, can be possible 
only through experiencing impossibility and not through trying to know impossibility. Derrida’s 
proposed unconditional hospitality thus inaugurates ethics through the experience of its 
aporetic structure, through the joy and pain of the impossible. Undeniably this experience oc-
curs whenever someone allows another person into their home. Whether we fully realize it or 
not, we are continually questioning the possibility of ethics, and must ask ourselves, once 
more, whether we will allow the other in. How else could community come about?
 In accordance with Bataille’s project of inner experience, unconditional hospitality’s 
heterogeneity peers through the cracks of its structure and gives life to itself as a beautiful 
ruin. Exposing  oneself to this ruin comes with a decision, a just decision that acts “in the night 
of non-knowledge and non-rule.”35  The host of the house must decide to subject herself to 
this failure in order to believe in hospitality, which is also to believe in the possibility of ethics. 
And does this inevitable failure, this inadequacy of mastery, not mark the total incomprehen-
sibility of the other? Does the failure to articulate the realm of nonknowledge not intimate the 
risk that always accompanies the host’s exposure to the guest since it is the guest who calls 
forth the realm of nonknowledge? Are risk and impossibility not two sides of the same 
nonknowledge coin? 
If so, then the host’s risk of hospitality must be thought of in terms of the project that 
fails but that nevertheless leaves him or her exposed to the guest. As with justice, 
unconditional hospitality is not only always already to come, but is also always already felt, 
even if incompletely. The impossible guest is someone who you will never know and who con-
stantly exposes you to the risk of your relationship, which is simply the risk and violence of 
being in relation. This risk is often naively overlooked within those relationships we hold 
dearest, but we must not forget that even our mother, husband, or best friend can never be 
fully known. That is, they are always in some sense a foreign guest and therefore always expose 
the violence and risk of relation. Which beckons the question, insofar as it is never fully possi-
ble to exclude any of those people closest to us from the possibility of inflicting  harm or vio-
lence, should we subject those whom we love to the same rules and regulations that we often 
employ to police our interactions with strangers? Of course not. What is hard to accept, but 
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35 Derrida, “Force of Law,” 967.
which Derrida’s rigorous logic reveals, is that to embrace one’s mother or child exposes one to 
the same vulnerability as opening a door for a stranger. It is to accept the violence and risk of 
being in relation with anyone. The incomprehensible otherness of those whom we love—that 
which sets them apart from every other single thing  and also that which they share even with 
the stranger at the door—demands unmediated, unconditional hospitality, even though this 
hospitality entails risk and impossibility. 
Conclusion
Derrida’s endorsement of a hospitality that cannot be achieved recognizes the other’s 
subjectivity as that which ultimately remains elusive. This unconditional hospitality is 
Derrida’s response to a history of ethics and morality that never questioned the foundations of 
their own possibility and therefore never considered a positive role for nonknowledge. Follow-
ing  the logic of traditional ethics, with adequate knowledge, an agent could be in a free and 
equal economical relationship with the other agents of its community. However, communica-
tion on this level is superficial and denies the depths that Bataille contemplated with his en-
gagement with community. The Bataillean community recognizes a primordial level where the 
self-containment necessary for economic exchange and preservation simply dissolves. For 
Derrida, hospitality and justice do not belong to such an economy either; there is everything 
to lose, but no-thing  to be gained by being  hospitable. What we presume to know of the other 
does not bring us together but rather keeps us apart. Derrida alludes to this phenomenon in 
terms of immigration in “Hospitality, Justice, and Responsibility.” What we “know” of immi-
grants keeps them out of our home—and quite possibly out of any home and may even lead 
them to Guantanamo Bay. Derrida thus suggests the impossible gift of unconditional hospital-
ity in which we ask for no knowledge of the other, ask them to abide by no rules, and grant 
them entry to our house once more—if, of course, this were possible.36
However, following  through with Derrida’s momentum, and in light of recent events 
such as Hurricane Katrina and the Tsunami that hit Southeast Asia, does the hospitable re-
sponse at times not require us to leave our home, give up our mastery, and willfully expose 
ourselves to the mastery of the foreigner, to become a foreigner ourselves? Hospitality can re-
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36 In practice, I do not believe Derrida would expect a person to attempt to engage the type of openness that 
unconditional hospitality demands. His explication of unconditional hospitality is a challenge to those who claim to 
engage ethics but who take for granted what actually is at stake, i.e., the possibility of ethics. Derrida’s consideration 
of hospitality exposes ethics in its frightening bareness and only from that terrifying exposure can a person make 
an ethical decision, whatever it may be. Derrida does not set a formula to eradicate evil or to secure safety; rather, 
he calls the agent to the space where perversion presents itself. Should we treat the stranger as we treat our family 
and friends? No. However, to treat the stranger as he or she truly presents him or herself at the threshold requires 
the host to assume a disposition that recognizes the stranger not as someone or something to be regulated but 
rather as a person, which is the starting point of any relation. 
tain its foundation in the sovereignty of the host and still proceed from the other direction. 
Hospitality takes on a new significance when the dimension of the stranger becomes the issue 
of exploration. Not only does our new globalized lens force the other into strangeness and for-
eignness, but it should also envision the self with the agency of a foreign other that has hospi-
table obligations. Wouldn’t willfully exposing  oneself to the other take on a new light if ap-
proached from the perspective of the misplaced foreigner with only the trace of the host? 
Continuing  the logic that Derrida pursues to derive the obligations of the host, we can apply it 
to a possible analogous set of obligations of the self as a foreigner. This extension of 
unconditional hospitality would include not only not harming  the gracious host, but also help-
ing  the host in need. The willful opening of the door for the stranger should also translate into 
offering the help to fix the door of the host in need.
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